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THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT SIZE ON ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
ON A GROUP OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
USING A PANEL DATA APPROACH
Tayseer Al-Sumadi and Basudeb Biswas

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the effect of government size, measured by the ratio of government
consumption expenditures to gross domestic product, GDP, on the rate of growth of per capita
GDP. Our sample includes 30 low-income and middle-income developing countries over the
period 1970-90. We use a panel data approach to avoid the shortcomings of the cross-country
models often used in such an analysis. The results indicate government size has a highly
/

significant negative influence on the rate of economic growth.
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THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT SIZE ON ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
ON A GROUP OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
USING A PANEL DATA APPROACH

1. Introduction

The heated debate about the extent of the government role in economic activities

IS

nothing new in the economic literature. In the sixteenth century, the mercantilist school
advocates "favored a strong central government to enforce the regulation of business" (Oser and
Blanchfield, 1975, p. 11). At that time, the government played a vital role in the economy and
adopted different policies of intervention, which included granting monopoly privileges,
imposing restrictions to limit competition, and providing subsidies to different economic sectors.
./

The eighteenth century witnessed the rise of the classical school following the pioneering
work of Adam Smith. The first and foremost principle of this school was laissez fair, which
claims "[t]hat government is best which governs least" (Oser and Blanchfield, 1975, p. 44). The
proponents of this free-enterprise economic theory argued the market is the right mechanism for
efficient allocation of resources. Therefore, the government role in economy should be limited to
the provision of public goods and services the private sector cannot or does not desire to provide.
These include national defense, maintenance of law and order, and basic infrastructures such as
railroads, ports, and dams.
The issue of government intervention took a new tum in the beginning of the nineteenth
century after the emergence of Marxist socialism. This school took the opposite extreme of the
classical school by introducing the idea of entrepreneurial government and favoring large-scale
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government intervention in the economy. The protagonists of this school argued the market
efficiency is attained under a set of unrealistic conditions, such as perfect competition and perfect
information, and in the absence of these conditions the market is doomed to fail, which creates a
prima facie for government intervention.

After World War II, the governments of developed and developing countries played a
vital role in economic activities. In the developed world, the birthplace of free-market theories,
government intervention came about as a result of the infrastructure destruction in the aftermath
of the war. In the developing countries, the governments assumed the central role in the economy
to build and develop the poor infrastructure. Most of the developing countries were under
colonial rule, which was unfavorable to local entrepreneurs and hence did not encourage private
investment. The legacy of the colonial era, coupled with the example of the Soviet model,
resulted in a greater participation by the state in economic development.
/

Government intervention in these countries went beyond the traditional role when the
public sector created many public enterprises engaged in industrial production in pursuing the
impoli-substituting-industrialization policies. The expansion of the public sector encouraged
rent-seeking activities at the expense of profit-seeking activities.
The oil crisis in 1979 and the external debt crises in the 1980s pointed to harmful effects
of government-led policies. Moreover, the poor performance of public enterprises in developing
countries over the last three decades highlighted the negative role of the government in the
functioning of the economy. Since then, it was proven that pervasive government intervention
contributed negatively to the overall economic performance.
The retrenchment of the developmental state paradigm and the sweeping privatization
triggered an overwhelming research attempting to investigate the effects of government size on
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economic and social welfare. In the absence of a clear-cut economic theory framework in this
area, in addition to some other factors to be explained later, this research came with conflicting
results. This paper aims to investigate the effect of government size on economic growth and to
investigate whether privatization is the panacea for the economic problems plaguing developing
countries. Our research departs from the vast majority of the received empirical literature in the
following ways: First, we use a panel data approach to study the effect of government size, in
lieu of a cross-country approach. Second, we provide overwhelming empirical evidence about
the effect of privatization in the countries implementing this policy. Finally, we use the most
recent data provided by Heston and Summers (1995).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.

Section 2 provides a theoretical

explanation of the secular growth of government size over time. Section 3 contains a review of
the empirical literature. Section 4 sheds light on the government role in the economies of some
J

Asian countries, i.e., the East Asian Miracle. The theoretical model is discussed in Section 5.
The data set and the empirical estimations are discussed in Section 6.

We end up with

concluding remarks in Section 7.

2. The Growth of Government Size

The secular growth of government spurred economists to investigate the reasons behind
the growth of the government size. Consequently, many theories have been put forward to
explain the growth of the public sector. These theories include a wide rage of explanations,
including social, political, and economic factors. We provide a cursory review of some of widely
prevalent theories in explaining the growth of government size:

4

Wagner's Law
One of the hypotheses aiming at explaining the secular growth of the government size is
what

IS

called Wagner's law, which was introduced by Adolph Wagner in late nineteenth

century. This hypothesis states that the income elasticity of demand for goods and services
provided by the government is greater than unity. The government size is expected to increase as
the level of per capita GDP increases.!

This hypothesis failed to specify the stage of

development in which this relationship is expected to occur. Moreover, it does not identify the
pattern of change of particular components of government expenditures (Afxentiou, 1982).
The empirical test of this hypothesis yielded mixed results. Easterly and Rebelo (1993)
found some support for Wagner's law while 10ulfaian and Marlow (1991) confirmed this
hypothesis in the U.S. economy. Lin (1994) found evidence that this hypothesis was true only in
developed countries. Ram (1987) found that while time-series models provide support for this
/

hypothesis, the cross-sectional models do not. Ferris and West (1996), however, failed to confirm
this hypothesis.

Public Choice Hypotheses
Some of the main functions of the government are to provide public goods and
services as well as to eliminate, or at least mitigate, externalities. Based on this argument, some
public choice hypotheses tend to explain the growth of the public sector. Median voter theorem
and the interest group hypothesis are eminent among these hypotheses. The first one suggests the
government opts to target certain groups of people (e.g., poor people, farmers, and urban
population) who might possess noticeable voting power. To gain their votes, the government

!See the appendix for the micro economic foundation of this hypothesis.
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might introduce some distributional measures to improve the welfare of these groups at the
expense of others who do not have the same voting power. This theorem is more applicable to
the democratic countries where the elections are held on a regularly basis to determine who will
govern the country. The local and national governments in these countries tend to increase their
expenditures by providing more goods and services (e.g., police, education, and transportation
services) to satisfy the needs of the targeted people. This results in larger government with more
public goods and services provided.
The interest group hypothesis explains the growth of government through the existence of
special interest groups who put pressures on the government to introduce some activities
designed to reduce the transaction costs borne by these groups. These groups could include the
govelnment employees who might have discretionary power to achieve their own interests at the
expense of the citizens (Mueller, 1987). When the new activities are introduced, it becomes
J

difficult to reduce or eliminate them in the future, which leads to secular growth in the size of the
government. The empirical evidence of Ferris and West (1996) provides some evidence in
support of these hypotheses.

Baumol's Effect
The government sector is typically labor intensive since employment is one of the
socioeconomic goals for any government. The growth of productivity is mostly embodied in
technological change. Baumol's effect or Baumol's cost disease argues that service sectors,
which are highly labor intensive, lag other sectors in productivity growth. Because of that, the
cost of providing public goods and services will increase more quickly than for private goods.
This causes prices of government goods and services to increase over time. Consequently, the
share of government activities in GDP will also increase over time.
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This hypothesis is based on the argument that the price elasticity of demand for goods and
services provided by the public sector is less than unity.2 Mueller (1987) found that Baumol's
effect explains 25% of the increase in government size for the average Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) country. Ferris and West (1996) reported
empirical results which lend support to this hypothesis.

Fiscal Illusion Hypothesis
This hypothesis assumes that the citizens measure the size of government by the size of
their tax bill. If the tax burden can be disguised then citizens cannot measure the true size of
government, which can grow beyond the levels they tolerate (Mueller, 1987). Kneebone (1992)
found support for the existence of fiscal illusion in the Canadian economy. Oates (1985) reported
the following five sources of this illusion:
Complexity of the tax structure. This means the more complex the government revenue
systelTI, the more difficult for the voters to estimate the actual tax -price they pay for public goods
and services.
Renter illusion. This occurs because the property tax is not paid by the tenants but by the
owners, who tend to pass this tax to the renters in the form of high rents. This makes the tenants
fail to link the size of government spending to their rent payment.
Income elasticity of the revenue system. This suggests people do not care about their tax
bill but about their tax rate. Therefore, in booming times when the income level increases, the
government levies more revenues and its size grows.
Debt illusion. In this case it is assumed the citizens care if the government projects are
financed through taxation, but they do not care if these projects are financed by government

2See the appendix for the micro economic foundation of this hypothesis.
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borrowing. Therefore, they fail to estimate the cost they bear as a result of this borrowing. This
means reliance on borrowing rather than taxation to finance public projects results in larger
government.
The flypaper effect. This means that the government officials can use the lump-sum
intergovernmental grants to convince the voters that there is a decrease in tax rates needed to
finance different government programs (Oates, 1985). Therefore, Oates (1985, pp. 23-24) defines
the flypaper effect as the existence of "a significantly higher propensity for recipients to increase
public expenditure in response to the lump-sum intergovernmental grants than in response to
equivalent increase in private income."

Political, Social, and Economic Ideology
As nlentioned at the outset, many economic schools have arisen in the last few centuries.
These schools have had different, political social, as well as economic backgrounds and
implications. Consequently, the size of the government varied substantially depending on the
ideologies prevailing in the subject countries. Government size was noticeably large in the
countries that imbued with the socialist paradigm (e.g., former Soviet Union and East Europe).
On the contrary, the government size in western countries, where the laissez faire dichotomy
prevailed, was smaller with a large private sector taking the economic lead.

Displacement Effect
The displacement effect hypothesis states the tax burden can increase when the taxpayers
believe that the increase is justified. For example, during war, depression, or other national
crises, the government involvement is expected to increase, so "an otherwise intolerable tax
burden may become acceptable" (Kneebone, 1992, p. 1297). However, because of the expanded

J
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bureaucracy and the concentration of power at the national level, the new situation, i.e., the
higher tax burden, is expected to continue even after the crisis passed (Slemrod, 1995).

3. Literature Review

In the last two decades, ample research about the effect of government involvement in
economic activities on economic growth has taken place. Given the difficulties in assessing the
real scale of government involvement, different proxies for this variable were employed,
including the size of govermnent consumption expenditure, government tax revenue, and the
ratio of public enterprises output to national output. This research resulted in conflicting results
with respect to the relationship between the government size and the rate of economic growth.
The conflicting results can be attributed to factors such as using different proxies for government
size, applying different proxies for the growth rate, using a sample of different countries at
/

different time periods, and using different ad hoc models in the absence of theoretical framework
to investigate the effect of government involvement as well as the process of economic growth.
Many factors triggered the wide research in these areas such as the sharp macroeconomic
imbalances of most countries, particularly in the developing world, the collapse of the command
economies, and the availability of worldwide comprehensive data.
Using cross-sectional data on 43 developed and underdeveloped countries from 1955-70,
Rubinson (1977) concluded there was a positive relationship between the government size,
measured by the ratio of government revenue to gross national product, GNP, and economic
growth. Employing cross-section data of 46 countries, Kormendi and Meguire (1985) found a
positive, but statistically insignificant, relationship between economic growth and the size of
government, indexed by government consumption as a ratio of GNP. Conte and Darrat (1988)
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employed time-series data on all OECD countries from 1960-84. Their results indicated public
sector expansion, indexed by total government outlays as a ratio of GDP, is not generally
accountable for retarding economic growth in OECD countries. Using government consumption
spending as an index of government size and covering 130 countries from 1960-85, Lin (1994)
used cross-country single and simultaneous equation models to find government size had a
positive impact on economic growth in the short run, but not in the intermediate one (25 years in
his study).
Ram (1986) used cross-sectional as well as time-series data on 115 developed and
developing countries employing a two-sector, government and nongovernment, production
function framework based on Feder's (1982) paper. He found a positive and highly significant
relationship between government size and economic growth. Ram's (1989) later analysis resulted
in a similar outcome. Employing the Denison growth accounting approach on cross-sectional
J

data of 42 developing countries, Diamond (1989) found a positive, but insignificant, relationship
between the economic growth rate and the overall size of government, measured by the ratio of
total government expenditures to GDP. When the structure of these expenditures was examined,
he concluded social government expenditures on housing, health, and welfare exerted a positive
significant effect on growth in the short run, while capital infrastructure expenditure had little
influence on growth. On the other hand, he concluded that directly productive capital expenditure
exerted a negative influence on economic growth.
Landau (1983) used cross-sectional data covering 96 countries and found that government
size, measured by the share of government consumption to GDP, made a negative contribution to
economic growth. In a more comprehensive and detailed study, Landau (1986) found consistent
results. He used pooled cross-section and time-series data on 65 developing countries from 1960-
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80. When the government expenditure was categorized, he found that government capital
expenditure was slightly harmful to economic growth.
Barro (1989) employed an endogenous growth model on cross-sectional data covering 98
countries from 1960-85, finding the size of government, proxied by the ratio of government
consumption spending, excluding defense and education, to GDP has a negative impact on the
economic growth. Barro (1991) employed an endogenous growth model on cross-sectional data
covering 72 countries from 1960-85, finding the size of government, measured by the ratio of
government consumption spending, excluding defense and education, to GDP has a negative
impact not only on the economic growth but also on the investment ratio, i.e., the ratio of public
and private investment to GDP.
Grier and Tullock (1989) employed pooled cross-section data on 113 countries over the
period 1950-81, and found a negative correlation between

government size, measured by
/

government consumption expenditures to GDP, and the rate of economic growth. In a sample of
107 countries during the period from 1970-85, Engen and Skinner (1992) used a generalized
production function approach assuming a two-sector model, taxed and untaxed, economy. They
found government spending and taxation were negatively associated with economic growth.
Using a sample of 79 developed and developing countries, Sachs and Warner (1995) found a
negative relationship between the growth rate and the ratio of real government consumption
spending, net of military and education spending, to real GDP.
Miller (1996) employed data on 22 aCED countries from 1960-88 using time-series and
pooled cross-section models and found the share of real government public expenditures in GDP
may not affect the real economic growth, while the increase in this share may have a negative
impact on the rate of economic growth. Employing a fixed effect model on a sample of 59
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middle-income developing countries over the period 1960-85, Guseh (1997) found a negative
relationship between the government size, indexed by the share of government consumption
expenditure in GDP, and the rate of economic growth.
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) followed Barro's (1991) cross-country regressIon and
reported a negative relationship between the growth rate and the government size, measured as
the ratio of tax revenue to GDP. However, they indicated this result was fragile. In their study of
sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth regressions, Levine and Renelt (1992) employed
different scenarios to investigate the relationship between government size and the rate of
economic growth. First, they used cross-sectional data on 64 countries and found a negative
relationship between the ratio of government consumption expenditures to GDP and growth rate.
Second, they used total government expenditures to GDP. Third, they used government
consumption share minus defense and educational expenditures. Finally, they used central
government surplus/deficit to GDP. All the results were negative, albeit not robust. Using a
model based on conventional demand theory framework and using time-series data on 20 African
countries from 1960-85, Bairam (1990) argued whether the size of government, indexed by the
size of total government expenditure, has positive or negative effects on economic growth is
country specific and therefore cannot be generalized.

4. East Asian Miracle and Government
Intervention

One of the most controversial issues in the economic literature on economic growth and
the role of government in the economic activities centers on what is known as the East Asian
Miracle. Eight east Asian countries, including China, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia,

Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan, recorded a spectacular rate of rapid and sustained
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economic growth over the last three decades. These high-performing Asian economies (HP AB)
outperformed the OEeD economies.
The high rates of sustained economic growth in these countries cast more doubt on the
validity of the neoclassical growth theory. This theory is based on the exogeniety of the saving
ratio and population growth and it assumes diminishing marginal productivity of inputs.
Furthermore, it is assumed that technology, which is exogenous, is the only factor to account for
economic growth. Given these assumptions, the theory predicts the developing countries will
achieve higher rates of economic growth than developed countries for a certain period of time.
Due to the assumed diminishing returns, however, the rates of economic growth in the
developing countries are expected to converge to a steady state.
In the case of the East Asian Miracle, the convergence expected in the neoclassical theory

did not exist. The celebrated work of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) introduced what is known
/

as endogenous growth theory. This theory assumes that technological change is endogenous and
emphasizes the importance of human capital and the accumulation of knowledge as important
factors in the economic growth process. These factors are not subj ect to a diminishing return to
scale, and the convergence, as the theory argues, is not necessary and the rates of economic
growth are related over time.
There is no consensus among the economists about the determinants of high economic
growth in the HP AB. An array of explanations has been introduced including cultural, religious,
regional, and economic factors. Nonetheless, the range and the effect of government
interventions with respect to this outstanding performance has not been settled yet. The governed
market theory, which is sometimes called the structuralist or revisionist school (e.g., Wade,
1990), argues this experience lends support to the state-led growth policies and emphasizes the
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impoliance of government intervention in achieving high rates of economic growth. Not only
this, but this theory argues the governments in these countries deliberately got the prices wrong
to affect the incentive system in favor of the industrial sector.
Free market theory (e.g., Chen, 1979), which is imbued with the principles of the
neoclassical theory, argues the state intervention in the HP AE was largely absent and the startling
performance of these economies was based on a market-led environment. There is also a group
of economists who argue that government intervention in these countries had negative impacts on
economic growth, which could have been larger in the absence of government intervention (see
Krueger, 1995).
Furthermore, there is a simulated free market theory or market friendly theory (e.g.,
World Bank, 1991; 1993) which recognizes the government intervention and believes this
intervention was wider than the creation of the suitable growth environment. This theory argues
/

the governments in these countries were simulating the free market.
The World Bank (1993) acknowledges the importance of the systematic government
intervention in these economies while emphasizing that these economies got the fundamentals
right. These fundamentals include low level of inflation, realistic exchange rates, building human
capital by giving much attention to the educational and training systems, creating effective and
secure financial systems, implementing successful technological catch-up, limiting the price
distortions, and limiting the bias against the agricultural sector. These economies adopted
outward-oriented policies, achieved egalitarian distribution of income, and encouraged or forced
high levels of domestic saving, which led to high levels of domestic investments.

14
5. Theoretical Modeling

As indicated earlier, the vast majority of empirical studies used cross-country models to
investigate the effect of government size on economic growth. However, these models suffer
from the following shortcomings. First, different countries have different specific effects.
Nonetheless, cross-country models ignore this fact and treat all countries as having the same
characteristics. If the country-specific effects are correlated with the explanatory variables, there
will be what is known as the omitted variable bias. Second, some variables might be time variant,
but the time factor is ignored in cross-country models. Third, cross-section data provide few
observations, which negatively affects the efficiency of econometric estimates. Because of the
aforelnentioned shortcomings, the validity of cross-country studies is cast in doubt. In addition,
Levine and Zervos (1993, pp. 426-427) argue that "cross-country regressions should be viewed
/

as evaluating the strength of partial correlation and not as behavioral relationship that suggest
how much growth will change when policies change."
Panel data models avoid these shortcomings for the following reasons. First, they
accommodate across-country and across-time differences. Second, they provide a large number
of data points, which increases the degrees of freedom and improves the efficiency of the
econometric estimates by reducing the collinearity among the explanatory variables. Therefore,
in our study, we employ the following theoretical econometric model using panel data to
investigate the relationship between the government size and the rate of growth or" per capita
Income:
~t =

AXit ,! + AXit ,2 +.... ·+AXit ,k + ~t (1= 1,2, .... ,N; t= 1,2, .... ,1).

(1)
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That is, the sample data are represented by observations on N cross-section units over T time
periods. Yit is the independent variable for the ith country in the tth time period. Xi! are
explanatory variables, B's are parameters to be estimated, and 0. is the stochastic disturbance.
In the classical linear regression model (CLRM), it is assumed the error term, which
includes the effect of unobserved variables, is independently distributed from the explanatory
variables. However, in the case of panel data, the omitted variables can be classified into three
groups: (1) time-varying country-invariant, (2) country-varying time-invariant, and (3) country
and time-varying variables. If these variables are correlated with the explanatory variables, the
CLRM estimation yields biased estimates of ;is.
Therefore, when panel data are employed, equation 1 can be estimated employing two
different approaches, depending on whether the unobserved effects are assumed to be correlated
or uncorrelated with the explanatory variables included in the model. These approaches are
incorporated in the fixed effect model and the random effect model.

Fixed Effect Mode
This approach assumes individual effects are fixed in nature (Islam, 1995) and
uncorrelated with the error term and are treated as fixed parameters. If the problem is that the
omitted time-varying or country-varying variables are correlated with the error term, the problem
can be solved by adjusting the dependent and independent variables through transformation from
individual means. Using this approach, equation 1 can be written as follows:
(2)
where ~'s are individual specific constants,

D/ s are group dummy variables, and E is the classical

stochastic disturbance with mean zero and variance

(T/.
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This model is estimated by using the least square dummy variable (LSDV) method and is
based on the assumption that only the intercept parameter varies and this variation occurs across
countries, but not over time. Hence all behavior differences between individual countries and
over time are captured by the intercept (Griffiths et al., 1993). Therefore, Equation 2 can be
simplified as follows:
(3)
However, this model is not without caveats. First of all, if the employed sample is drawn
from a large population, it is unreasonable to assume that differences between countries are
nothing but parametric shifts. Second, the estimation results of this model cannot be generalized
on countries out of the sample. Third, in case of correlation of both time-varying country-varying
effects with the explanatory variables, this model cannot be estimated.

Random Effect Model
As mentioned earlier, the fixed effect model cannot be used when the omitted variables
are time and country-varying. In this case the random effect model is the appropriate method.
This model is suitable when the countries included in the sample have been chosen randomly to
represent larger population. Consequently, this model deals with the individual effects as random
variables. The error term has three components, time-specific effect (Wt), country-specific effect

(Vi), and time and country-specific effect

(~it).

These effects are assumed to be independent of the

regressors. The error term can be written as follows (Kmenta, 1986; Greene, 1992; Miller, 1996;
Miller and Russek, 1997):

(i=1,2, ..... ,N; t=1,2, ..... ,1)

(4)
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Further, it is assumed the error term has the following properties (Kmenta, 1986; Greene,
1992; Miller, 1996; Miller and Russek, 1997):

E(Vi Vj)=a} , l7 i=j ; 0 otherwise

E(~it~js)=CTJL2, l7 i=j and t=s ; 0 otherwise

These implications imply

Cit

(5)

is homoscedastic with the following variance:
(6)

Substituting equation 4 into equation 1:
(7)
If the components of the error term are known, this model can be estimated uSIng
generalized least square (GLS). However, if these components are unknown, the model should be
estimated using feasible generalized least square (FGLS).

6. Data Set and Empirical Estimation

The Data Set
The study employs a panel data set of 30 developing countries over the period 1970-90.
Of these countries, 15 are low-income countries and 15 are middle-income countries. The
countries were classified based on the World Bank classification by level of income in 1992-93.
The countries included in the study are listed in table 1. Figure 1 shows the secular growth of
government size in these countries, measured by government consumption to GDP, over the

/
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study period. It is apparent that government size recorded sustained growth during the last three
decades.
The primary source of our data set is Heston and Summers (1995). Other sources include
the International Monetary Fund (1988) and the World Bank (1992, 1993, and 1996).
As Inentioned earlier, the economic theory does not provide a clear framework to
estimate the relationship between government size and economic growth and there is no
consensus among the economists about a given framework to investigate this issue. Different
approaches and various sets of dependent and explanatory variables have been employed in the
existing empirical literature without proving the superiority of a particular one over the others.
Levine and Renelt (1992, p. 942) indicated "that over 50 variables have been found significantly
correlated with growth in at least one regression."
Based on what can be deduced from the economic theory and the existing empirical
/

literature, our empirical model will have the following ad hoc formulation:
(8)
where y is the growth rate of per capita income, Govt is the size of government proxied by the
share of government consumption expenditures in GDP, Inv is the investment share, public plus
private investment, of GDP, Opn is an indicator of the economy openness measured by the ratio
of exports plus imports to GDP, Pop is the annual growth rate of population, CAd is the ratio of
current account deficit, before official transfers, to GDP, and Extd is the ratio of total external
debt, private and public, to GDP. u,
the stochastic disturbance term.

p,

8, y, A,

~,

and 8 are coefficients to be estimated and

E

is

19
Set of Hypotheses
Through the estimation of this model, the following hypotheses will be tested: Hypothesis
1: There is a negative relationship between government size and economic growth, i.e., jJ has a
negative sign. This hypothesized relationship is attributed to the inefficiency of the public sector,
the crowding out effect of government expenditure, the price distortion because of government
policies, and the deterioration in saving rates as a result of government budget deficits.
Hypothesis 2: Public and private investment exerts positive influence on economic growth, i.e.,
the predicted sign of c5 is positive. This is attributed to the investment role in capital accumulation
which is vital for economic growth. It is noteworthy here that Levine and Renelt (1992) indicated
that the investment rate was found to be one of the most robust variables in the economic growth
emplf1Cs.
Hypothesis 3: The open economies experience a high and positive rate of economic growth, i.e.,
/

the hypothesized sign of y is positive. The positive sign is due to the effect of trade openness on
specialization, efficient resource allocation, economies of scale, and technological improvement.
Hypothesis 4: There is not an a priori relationship between the rate of economic growth and
population growth rate, i.e., the sign of A is unknown. The difficulty in predicting this sign has
theoretical, as well as empirical roots. In the neoclassical growth theory there should be one-forone effect of p·opulation growth on rate of economic growth if all countries are in a steady state
of economic growth (Kormendi and Meguire, 1985). However, we do not have any prediction
about the stage of the steady state in our sample of developing countries. Moreover, no
significant correlation was found between the two variables over the last century in those
countries now considered as developed (Simon, 1976).
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Hypothesis 5: There is a negative relationship between the current account deficit and economic
growth, i.e., ¢ has a negative sign. This is attributed to the negative contribution of this deficit to

the country foreign reserve, budget deficit, and vulnerability to the external shocks.
Hypothesis 6: The higher the ratio of external debt to GDP, the lower the level of economic
growth, i. e., the sign of B is hypothesized to be negative. This is due to the effects of the external

debt on exchange rate, state independence, and capital outflows.
Of course these hypotheses will be tested against the simple null hypothesis that no
relationship exists between economic growth and each one of these macroeconomic variables.

The Empirical Estimation
First of all, we have conducted different specification tests to choose the most plausible
model for our empirical estimation. The F-test was performed to compare the performance of the
fixed effect model versus the OLS model, which is the null hypothesis. The Lagrange multiplier
(LM) test was conducted to test the random effect model against the OLS model, which is the
null hypothesis. The Wald test was performed to compare the performance of the fixed effect
model against the random effect model, which is the null hypothesis.
The result of the F-test was in favor of the fixed effect model. Moreover, the LM test led to
rejection of the random effect model, and the Wald test indicated the superiority of the fixed
effect model against the random effect model. Therefore, the fixed effect model dominates the
random effect model and the OLS model. However, the empirical results of the OLS, random
effect, and fixed effect models are presented in table 2.
It is evident the coefficient of the government size variable is negative and statistically
significant at less than 50/0 level of significance. This purports that the larger the government size,
the lower the rate of economic growth. Figure 2 plots the economic growth rate against the
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government SIze for the whole sample. Apparently the simple correlation between the two
variables is strongly negative.
The empirical results indicate there is a negative relationship between the economIC
growth rate and the current account deficit. However, this relationship is insignificantly different
from zero. Figure 3, which shows the simple correlation between the current account deficit and
the rate of economic growth, reflects an ambiguous relationship. It seems our hypothesis
regarding the negative relationship between the ratio of external debt to GDP is not supported by
the empirical estimation. The coefficient of the external debt ratio to GDP is negative but
statistically insignificant. Furthermore, figure 4, which shows the simple correlation between the
two variables, reveals the absence of any clear cut relationship between the two variables.
As indicated earlier, the investment rate was found to be one of the most robust variables
of the economic growth empirics. This has been confirmed in our study, which shows a highly
J

significant positive relationship between the rate of investment and the rate of economic growth.
The strongly positive simple correlation between the two variables, as shown in figure 5,
supports this result. The influence of trade openness on economic growth is found to be positive,
but statistically insignificant. Nonetheless, figure 6 purports a positive simple correlation
between the two variables. Lastly, the population growth is found to exert a negative and highly
significant influence on the rate of economic growth. The coefficient of this variable is negative
and statistically significant at less than 1% level of significance. In addition to that, when the two
variables are plotted against each other in figure 7, the negative simple correlation between the
two variables is vividly captured. This negative relationship can be attributed to different factors
such as the increase in the dependency ratio and the trade off between the quality and quantity of
human capital.
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7. Conclusions

In this essay, we have employed a panel data approach to investigate the relationship
between government size and economic performance in terms of economic growth. Different
specification tests have been conducted to choose the most appropriate model for our empirical
investigation. The fixed effect model proved to be the most plausible one. The results of this
model lend support to the argument that the larger the government size, the worse the economic
performance.
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Table 1. Developing countries included in the study
Country

Country Code 1

Country Region

Low Income Group
Bangladesh

BGD

Asia

Benin

BEN

Africa

China

CRN

Asia

Egypt

EGY

Africa

Ghana

GHA

Africa

Honduras

HND

Central America

Indja

IND

Asia

Indonesia

IDN

Asia

Kenya

KEN

Africa

Lesotho

LSO

Africa

Mali

MLI

Africa

Nicaragua

NIC

Central America

Nigeria

NGA

Africa

Pakistan

PAK

Asia

Sri Lanka

LKA

Asia

Algeria

DZA

Africa

Brazil

BRA

South America

Chile

CHL

South America

Ecuador

ECU

South America

Gabon

GAB

Africa

Jordan

JOR

Asia

Korea

KOR

Asia

Mexico

MEX

North America

Peru

PER

South America

Syria

SYR

Asia

Middle

Income

Group

J
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Thailand

THA

Asia

Trinidad and Tobago

TTO

Central America

Turkey

TUR

Europe

Uruguay

URY

South America

1Country

codes are based on Heston and Summers (1995).
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Table 2. Parameter estimates of the growth equation from the pooled sample, 1970-90
Variable
Constant
Govt
Cad
Extd
Inv
Opn
Pop
F-test
LM test
Wald test
R2

OLS
-0.00124
(-2.511)
-0.00015
(-0.336)
0.00002
(0.149)
0.00095
(2.083)
0.00005
(0.435)
-1.07380
(-4.032)

Fixed effect

-0.00454
(-5.512)
-0.00025
(-0.477)
-0.00003
(-0.205)
0.00210
(2.591)
0.00017
(0.624)
-1.48420
(-4.450)
1.87

Random effect
0.06231
(3.890)
-0.00158
(-2.955)
-0.00010
(-0.217)
0.00002
(0.139)
0.00089
(1.827)
0.00006
(0.520)
-1.13338
(-4.092)

0.05
28.48
0.06
0.14
0.06
*Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-ratios for the corresponding coefficients.
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Appendix

Wagner's Law
Consider an economy of two sectors, i.e., government and nongovernment sectors,
respectively. The utility function for a representative consumer in this economy can be written as
follows:
(AI)

U=U(G, NG)
where

G donates government produced goods and servIces and NG donates

nongovernment produced goods and services.
(A2)

Max U=U(G, NG)
Subject to:

(A3)
where I is the consumer income

/

(A4)

PGdG+PNGdNG=dI

(AS)

PGG

I

dG

PNGNG

I

G

dI

I

--x-x-+

I

dNG

NG

dI

x--x--=l

(A6)

Let KG and KNG denote the share of government and nongovernment in consumer income,
respectively.
Let

llG

and

llNG

denote income elasticity of demand for government and nongovernment

produced goods and services, respectively. Under the assumption of full employment, the income
elasticity of demand for all goods and services produced in the economy is unity (Johnson,
1973). Therefore, equation A6 can be written as follows:
(A7)
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This equation implies that the weighted average of income elasticities is equal to 1.
(A8)

PG

d(-G-)
dKG =
1

d1

d1

(A9)

(AIO)

dG 1
PG-x--PG
G
d1 G
G
12

(All)

(AI2)
dKG
Therefore, if 'lG)1,--)0

d1

/

Baumol's Effect
Let us

consider an economy with two

sectors, i.e.,

government sector and

nongovernmentn sector. Figures Al and A2 represent the demand for and supply of government
and nongovernment goods and services, respectively. Since the numeraires are chosen arbitrarily,

If the income elasticity of demand for government produced goods "and services, i.e., llG, is
greater than unity, the income elasticity of demand for nongovernment produced goods and
services, i.e., llNG, should be less than unity. Therefore, if real per capita income increased, the
DG

will shift to the right more than

DNG

as portrayed in figures Al and A2, respectively. Given

the assumption that the government sector is less capital intensive than the nongovernment one,
the supply function for the former will shift to the right less than that of the latter as shown in
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figures Al and A2, respectively. The net result will be an increase in the price of government
produced goods and services from PG to PG 1 and a decrease in the price of nongovernment
produced goods and services from P NG to P NG 1.
Proof·

(A14)
Let

(j)

and r denote the price of labor and capital, respectively,
(AlS)
(A16)

Let

~

(i=L,K) denote the share of input i in producing a dollar worth of goods and services,
/\

/\

PG
/\

/\

PN G =

As assumed in this hypothesis

BL, G>BL,NG

/\

= BL ,G (j)+ BK ,G r
BL ,NG

and

(j)+

(A17)
/\

BK ,NG r

(A18)

BK, G <BK,NG

/\

Assume now that r = 0, from equations A17 and A18

(A19)

But

t{ , G >- t{ , NG

(A20)

From equation A19:
/\

P

_G_
/\

PNG

>-1

(A2l)

